Author: Clarke Foster
The polarization of modern politics is a symptom of a lack of pluralism within political leadership. The two party system and populism imply more homogeneity in the American people than truly exists. The actors which make up parties and the public as a whole have specific interests. Politics aiming towards an elevated common interest runs the risk reproducing the fac- tions of those closest to power. Rather than focusing on common interest vs self-interest, a focus on the constituent actors in political movements and institutions and the dynamics between them can shift focus towards an actionable pluralism. This centers polit- ical action and discussion as means of mobilizing the public to enable self expression and organization. Limitations on political self expression and direction run deep in the American political system, favoring representation of plural interests within the two parties and even active hostility from the parties towards organi- zation outside of them. Creating a more pluralist politics requires opposing and changing the politics of ruling factions inside parties, in electoral law, and even regarding the Constitution. Such plu- ralist politics favor not a single common political project, but the means of political groups to represent themselves outside of and against the dominant two party system. Such politics may seem counterproductive to fighting polarization, but rather point to the depth of the problem and the complicity of the two parties in the problem. The scale of the dissatisfaction with present politics needs to be addressed with efforts to present new framings and legitimize political action, just as the ruling parties will continue to do.
Common interest is a popular ideal for organizing political action. However, common interest is only as useful as
it is realizable. Aristotle suggests that the common interest can be best approached through bringing together the interests of all actors in a society (1297b37-1298a33). Government in the common interest should see many voters of many backgrounds settle on candidates who best represent their shared interests and the same occurs between representatives in the legislature. Here an approximation of a common interest is arrived at in a liberal democratic state. This model accepts that voters act in self interest, but that legislators should not. In practice, representa- tives also act in self interest, and like any specific voter, have an interest informed by their place in society, including their place as a representative. A unique characteristic of representatives compared with the voters is their ability to make enforced polit- ical decisions. This is key to forming the interest of a representa- tive. Voters and representatives will group together out of shared interest as well as strength in numbers. This is more important for representatives than it is for voters as representatives cannot make decisions alone, but voters must alone make one decision. Formation of parties lets political actors find those with shared interests and gain the numbers to make decisions.
Focusing on self-interests over one common interest acknowledges political diversity as well as specific interests of decision makers. Striving for common interests runs the risk of being in practice indistinguishable from the narrow interests of the ruling faction. A society of plural self-interested actors does not need to threaten a stable democracy. Ernesto Laclau,
a theorist of populism, understands democracy as existing with the populace directly who organize themselves as democratic subjects to fulfill their specific demands derived from their interests (106). Because of the different actions and interests of democratic subjects, Laclau’s democracy is ideally decentralized and pluralist so each subject can enact their demands themselves (107). To act effectively in centralized decision making systems, democratic subjects join together into populist subjects. The populist subject consolidates the demands of the democratic subjects and aims to implement them centrally (106). The bonds between democratic subjects emerge through discourse using the equivalence logic, identifying common experiences, mainly status of demands as unmet, and differential logic, identifying different experiences especially relating to treatment by deci- sion-making institutions (106). These form the people-elite perspective associated with populism. Empty signifiers appeal to democratic subjects and bring them into populist movements’ equivalential chain without them needing to buy into every view of every member in the movement. These movements then contain significant heterogeneity. In Trump’s movement social conservatives could latch on to the movement for the potential of removing protections for abortion and LGBT non-discrimination without committing as strongly to other facets of the narrative like opposition to NAFTA. Some may not endorse many facets of the movement, but support it as a means to political power.
Populist movements centralize disparate political actors to prioritize political effectivity in centralized institutions (Laclau 108). Parties will strive to achieve majorities to ensure they can act alone. Ineffective leadership could fracture a ruling majority if some demands are met, but others are not (Laclau 106). To limit internal fractures, homogeneous ideology can align inter- ests and ensure political actors don’t take their narrow victories and abandon the movement. These ideologies are often treated as synonyms with the common interest. Trump’s Republican Party has developed a unifying nationalism to keep in line and motivate its actors towards change and the enforcement of an image of the Constitution.
The Democrats position themselves as the sole vehicle for the defense of democracy, the Constitution, and a liberal society. The parties’ interests generally bias towards the interests of party leaders through control of political capital such as funding, com- mittee assignments, and legislative priorities. Recent examples include Trump’s removal of Ronna McDaniel as head of the RNC and the continued role of superdelegates, high ranking party members, in selecting the Democratic presidential nominee (Haberman). The Democrats did reform this system in 2018 after allegations that they helped bias the 2016 primary for Clinton (Stewart). These limit how much voters and elected officials are able to operate inside the party against leadership. When a faction is unable to gain a majority, its leaders must make con- cessions and cooperate to rule. Both the Democrats and Repub- licans approach politics as though they should both necessarily rule by majority, acting to prevent minorities from forcing them to powershare. Inside the party, these factions do exist such as the Freedom Caucus or the progressive left. Between parties, they have generally accepted the right of each other to rule as a majority, and prevent other parties from requiring them to form coalitions. By ensuring they are the only routes for their voters to realize their political goals, they limit the concessions the leading party interests must make in government.
The underlying diversity of populist movements and the public generally could be leveraged to the benefit of plural- ism. The current composition of the parties and the identities associated with them could be weakened if constituent actors in the political parties had more credible options to choose from. With more options, Black voters, environmentalists, Catholics, or libertarians may form their own parties forcing renegotiation of the ruling coalitions and diminishing the centralized power of the Democrats and Republicans. Minority political actors could be a check on larger ones by necessitating cooperation to take action. The American public in polling appears open to politics outside of the two parties. As of 2023, 40% of Americans identify as independents and 28% of Americans viewed both the Democrats and Republicans unfavorably (Gallup, Pew). Despite this, 3 members of Congress come from outside of the two parties and all caucus with one. If the American public is so internally diverse why does the political system offer only the two options? Two party rule is self-perpetuating, driven both by the form of the American electoral system and the actions of the two parties. All political actors want their demands met, but in the US, only the Democrats and Republicans can reasonably access the halls of power. This causes citizens to strategically vote for the two parties. Those representatives will be subject to pressure to conform to the party as to maintain legislative majorities. Lacking the formal coalition agreements common in multiparty systems, minority factions within parties are not treated as equal partners in government, but expected to show up to support the party. Without other options to achieve power, a legislator must commit to the party to be effective. This changes legislators’ interests in ways voters are not subject to. Donors and lobbyists will also influence their interests. Through Citizens United v. FEC regulations on political donors were significantly weakened, making more money available largely to the two parties who can access power. This and the money from the parties themselves make it preferable to remain with a major party. These insulate ruling factions from minority grassroots pressure, although upsets like Trump can gain sufficient power in a party to force it to change. Trump also demonstrates that large internally diverse parties don’t necessarily moderate, with more traditionally mod- erate Republicans often supporting the polarizing leadership to maintain access to power. With more routes to power, political allegiance would not have to be a binary opposition.
Multiparty politics that might empower these minority actors find themselves at a disadvantage in the American politi- cal system. The first past the post electoral system tends toward two parties who offer democratic subjects the best chance at proximity to power (Myatt 257). The need for these single party majorities are seen in the Presidency and Congress as well as most state level systems. The choice in these elections determines control over executive agencies and the legislative process and very importantly the courts. While the courts are less directly influenced by the parties, their influence over the constitutional system make them central to enacting political change. Voters are unlikely to risk using their vote on a candidate unable to reach these leading roles. Aside from the barriers produced by the current electoral system, the parties routinely take hostile action against third parties. The parties often try to block ballot access of third parties, mainly Libertarians and Greens, while claiming their measures protect the integrity of elections against fraud (Schoenbaum, Svitek). When third parties or independents do manage to gain moderate support, the losing major parties will routinely blame the third party for their loss as in the cases of Perot and Nader (Campbell, Salazar). Whether intentional or not, this implies an entitlement of the major party to the voters of the third party seen as closest to the major party.
Efforts to strengthen third parties have been introduced, mainly by Democrats, but to limited scope and effect. Fusion voting, allowing candidates to appear on ballots under multiple party affiliations, has been implemented in several states and upheld by the Supreme Court in Timmons v. Twin Cities. Minor parties within a major party have been able to gain con- cessions one would expect to see from coalitions in multi-party systems (Kantack 292). Fusion voting offers a means for more diversity within the two-party system, but has not been successful in moving beyond it.
In New York, the Working Families Party has seen moderate success organizing in the left flank of the Democratic Party.
The Green Party, positioning themselves similarly ideologically but independent of the Democrats, have not seen such traction (Fertik 52-53). In more recent years, reformists have proposed ranked choice voting where voters rank the candidates weakening strategic voting. Some local governments and the whole of the states of Alaska and Maine have adopted ranked choice voting, but the dominance of the two parties remains. Demo- crats and Republicans alike in various jurisdictions have fought ranked choice initiatives with some Republican states going as far as banning the practice (Austermuhle, Dunlap). In total 3 of 435 representatives and 4 of 100 senators are elected by ranked choice. Existing independent politicians are largely expected to toe a party’s line on major votes and caucus with a major party (Friesdorf). All members of the House are Democrats or Re- publicans. The continued dominance of the two parties requires those who are more independent to still rely on the parties to get things done without much leverage to get concessions. Third parties have not gained enough strength on a national scale to challenge the two party system. Without significant and wide- spread changes to the electoral system third parties are unlikely to bring the change needed to build pluralist multiparty politics.
The weakness of and hostility towards third parties accounts for some of the difference between interests expressed by voters and those enacted by political institutions. Beyond elected representatives, limited means of popular participation is a problem of the larger constitutional system. Voters and elected officials alike offer desires and descriptions of the Constitution which do not reflect the Constitution as it exists. In political rhetoric the Constitution is almost an empty signifier. Claims of defending and maintaining the Constitution are ubiquitous and bolster policy goals more than they comment on the constitu- tional order. The Constitution is then a sacred embodiment of their image of American liberty, regardless of the meaning of the text given by the courts. For Locke and the founders, liberty precedes and must inform all politics. All governments, reliant on and subordinate to the people, must respect liberty. Any action, including revolution, can be justified if liberty is violated (Locke Sec. 222). By treating the Constitution as inviolable as liberty, allegations of violation of liberty by the constitutional government are not indicative of a weakness in the Constitution or a failure of it to reflect liberty as the democratic subject understands it. The Constitution as an ideal takes precedence in rhetoric over the Constitution as the system perpetuating perceived systemic problems. The sacred status of the Constitution in political discourse protects constitutional political processes from attempts at significant direct change like the framers undertook, even as general change is being demanded. Since the 50s, the change has been largely directed through the courts, see- ing introduction of new rights through judicial activism. Today populism looms large with efforts for commanding majorities to impose demands against the political system.
The meaning of and means to change the Constitution lies officially almost exclusively with the Supreme Court. While the text of the Constitution can be changed according to Article V this is immensely difficult and rare. Voters unhappy with current politics will additionally find this process locked behind state and federal legislatures controlled by the two parties. Func- tionally, the Constitution can be changed by the Supreme Court in ways comparable to amendments. The differences in the constitutional systems under Plessy v. Ferguson and Brown v. Board represent similar changes to the US as before the 15th Amendment and during its enforcement. The reconstruction amendments are good examples here because their function changed greatly depending on the actors in power. The Con- stitution is inseparable from the self-interested political actors with the power to realize it. When this does not occur the courts should be enforcing actors. But this ability to compel constitu- tional compliance means the ability to change the operations of the constitutional system with a change in interpretation of the text alone. This power to change the Constitution drives inter- est in the court, but also endangers its legitimacy. Democrats after Dobbs v. Jackson and Republicans over the events at the Texas-Mexican border have been calling for political measures to override these decisions of the Supreme Court (Paz, Choi and Downen). Given the way the Supreme Court has become syn- onymous with constitutional authority, this seems to imply a desire for a Constitution subject to more democratic control. As of now, political control over the courts and the Constitution lie largely in the hands of the two parties.
The matter of changing the Constitution was central to the framers. The Constitution replaced the Articles of Confederation because its inability to change posed a threat to the Union (Publius No. 15). At the same time, frequent and easy amendments would weaken the power of the states and be subject to political zeal (Publius No. 85). The occasional power to amend delegated to the people is rarely evoked. Frequent and politically charged changes enacted without much participation of the pub- lic and the states are now the norm through the Supreme Court. As the public desires greater political representation and control, widespread change will likely be necessary. With the minimally impactful effects of changes in small states to the two party system, multiple large states would likely have to sign on to give enough momentum for third parties to gain effective power.
At least a party would have to participate, though referenda for such amendments may to some extent shift power away from the parties in those processes. Efforts at a federal level would likely require constitutional change. The decisions in Breedlove v. Suttles and Oregon v. Mitchell prevented major congressional change to state and local electoral laws leading to the 24th and 26th Amendments. Given the threat to the two parties’ power presented by a change in favor of stronger third parties, political organization and action inside and against the two parties by independents and advocates of pluralism would be necessary to obtain sufficient support for amendments, state or federal.
The final means of change realistically exists only as a rhetorical tool. That is for the people to invoke what Madison did in 1787, the necessity of organized political action outside the system where the system is unable to change itself and pre- serve the Union (Publius No. 15). As an empty signifier, this appeals to the national narrative and rhetoric of popular sover- eignty. When combined with a movement to mobilize voters and pressure the parties to change. Compared to populist movements who aim to realize the myriad demands of it democratic subjects, the comparatively narrow policy demand of a movement for such electoral reform makes it difficult to split, although incredi- bly difficult to implement. Reforms towards a multiparty system could appeal to groups across ideological lines as the future vehicle of their political projects. All that is easier said than done. Such a movement would be in a very weak starting position and constantly fighting to not be seen as a mere spoiler to the parties in power. Although difficult, this is not unprecedented. Progres- sives and populists won the direct election of senators, suffragists won women the right to vote, black activists got their consti- tutional rights enforced. None of these movements overthrew political orders entirely and neither would a modern political movement. But their higher standard of democracy which was not compatible with their status quos guided their activism within and against the ruling factions of their days. When people approach politics with the belief that they have the right and means to condition their support of the political system, their beliefs will either display a chasm between their interests and
the actions of political leaders or pressure them to participate in change. It is time to act to ensure that change.
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